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Abstract
Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by a set of selfish
peers. Each peer has the ability to change the network in a limited way, e.g., by creating or deleting
incident links. In doing so, a peer can reduce its individual communication cost. Typically, these costs are
modeled by the maximum or average distance in the network. We introduce a generalized version of the
basic network creation game (BNCG). In the BNCG (by Alon et al., SPAA 2010), each peer may replace
one of its incident links by a link to an arbitrary peer. This is done in a selfish way in order to minimize
either the maximum or average distance to all other peers. That is, each peer works towards a network
structure that allows himself to communicate efficiently with all other peers. However, participants of
large networks are seldom interested in all peers. Rather, they want to communicate efficiently only
with a small subset of peers. Our model incorporates these (communication) interests explicitly. In the
MAX-version, each node tries to minimize its maximum distance to nodes it is interested in. Likewise,
the goal of each node in the AVG-version is to minimize the corresponding average distance.
Given peers with interests and a communication network forming a tree, we prove several results on
the structure and quality of equilibria in our model. For the MAX-version, we give an upper worst case
bound of O (√n) for the private costs in an equilibrium of n peers. Moreover, we give an equilibrium
for a circular interest graph where a node has private cost Ω (
√
n), showing that our bound is tight. This
example can be extended such that we get a tight bound of Θ(
√
n) for the price of anarchy. For the case
of general communication networks we show the price of anarchy to be Θ(n). Additionally, we prove
an interesting connection between a maximum independent set in the interest graph and the private costs
of the peers. For the AVG-version, we give a linear lower bound on the worst case private costs in an
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In a network creation game (NCG), several selfish players create a network by egoistic modifications of its
edges. One of the most famous NCG models is due to Fabrikant et al. [6]. Their model intends to capture
the dynamics in large communication and computer networks built by the individual participants (peers,
players) in a selfish way: participants try to ensure a network structure supporting their own communication
needs whilst limiting their individual investment into the network. Since the players do not (necessarily)
cooperate, the resulting network structure may be suboptimal from a global point of view. The analysis of
the resulting structure and its comparison to a (socially) optimal structure is a central aspect in the analysis
of network creation games.
In the original model by Fabrikant et al., players may buy (or create) a single edge for a certain (fixed)
cost of α > 0. Their goal when buying edges is to improve the network structure with respect to their
individual communication needs. There are typically two ways to formalize the corresponding communica-
tion cost of a single peer: the maximum distance to any other node in the network (local diameter) or the
average distance to all other nodes in the network. We refer to the different variants by MAX-version and
AVG-version, respectively. Alon et al. [2] introduce a slightly simpler model, called basic network creation
games (BNCG). Here, they drop the cost parameter α. Instead, they limit the possible ways in which peers
may change the network by restricting them to edge swaps: a peer may only replace one of its incident
edges with a new edge to an arbitrary node in the network. Since peers are assumed to be selfish, only edge
swaps (also including simultaneous swapping of several edges at once) that improve the private commu-
nication cost of the corresponding peer are considered. In a swap equilibrium, no player can decrease its
communication cost by an edge swap. This simpler variant of network creation games has the advantage of
an equilibrium notion that allows for a polynomially computable best response of the players. Moreover,
it still captures the inherent dynamic character and difficulty of communication networks formed by selfish
participants, while avoiding the quite intricate dependence on the parameter α (see related work).
Our work generalizes the BNCG model of Alon et al. by introducing the concept of interests. In real
communication networks, like the Internet, participants are typically only interested in a small subset of
peers rather than the complete network. Thus, each participant has a certain set of peers it is interested
in. Now, instead of trying to minimize the maximal or average distance to all other nodes, the individual
players consider only the corresponding distances to nodes they are interested in. The main part of our
analysis focuses on tree networks (which are preserved by the peers). Especially, we show that tree networks
perform much better than general networks with respect to the price of anarchy. To avoid networks to
become disconnected (note that in a BNCG peers want to communicate with all other peers and hence never
disconnect the network), we restrict the peers to swaps that preserve connectivity of the network. This
restriction is valid from a practical point of view, where a lost network connectivity is to be avoided, since
re-connecting a network causes high or even unpredictable costs (if it is possible at all). Moreover, if you
consider that interests of the peers may change over time, it is also important for each single selfish peer to
sustain connectivity.
1.1 Model & Notions
An instance of the basic network creation game with interests (I-BNCG) is given by a set of n players (peers,
nodes) V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, an initial connection graph G = (V,E), and an interest graph GI = (V, I ).
We use I (v) := {u ∈ V | {v, u} ∈ I } to refer to the neighborhood of a player v in the interest graph and
denote them as the interests of v. Both the connection graph and the interest graph are undirected. Thus,
interests are always mutual. The connection graph represents the current communication network and can
change during the course of the game. We consider only instances where the (initial) connection graph is a
tree, whereas the interest graph GI may be an arbitrary and not necessarily connected graph. Each player
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is assumed to have at least one interest. Given a current connection graph, we study two different ways to
formalize the private communication costs of nodes: the MAX-version and the AVG-version. In the first, the
private cost c(v) := max {d(v, u) | u ∈ I (v)} of a node v ∈ V is defined as the maximum distance from v
to the nodes it is interested in (its interests). In the second, we define c(v) :=∑u∈I (v) d(v,u)|I (v)| as the average
distance to its interests. Here, d(v, u) denotes the (shortest path) distance between u and v in the connection
graph.
To improve its private cost, a player u may perform edge swaps in the connection graph: replace an
incident edge {u, v} with a new edge {u,w} to an arbitrary player w ∈ V , written as u : [v → w]. We
refer to a single as well as to a series of simultaneously executed edge swaps of a player u as an improving
step, if u’s private cost decreases. A player is only allowed to perform an improving step if the connection
graph stays connected. If no player can perform an improving step, we say the connection graph is in a
MAX-equilibrium or AVG-equilibrium, respectively. See Figure 1 for an example.
w
u
v
(a) Connection graph where node v is not in a MAX-equi-
librium, c(v) = 4.
w
u
v
(b) After swap v : [u → w] the private cost of v is
c(v) = 3.
Figure 1: MAX-version example of a connection graph. The gray nodes denote I (v), the thick line a longest
shortest path from v to a node in I (v). In (a) we have private cost c(v) = 4. By the swap in (b) the private
cost decreases to c(v) = 3.
The overall quality of a connection graph G is measured by the social cost c(G) :=
∑
v∈V c(v) as the
sum over all private costs. Our goal is to analyze the structure and social cost of worst case swap equilibria
and compare them with a general optimal solution (which is not necessarily a swap equilibrium). As usual
in algorithmic game theory, we use the ratio of these two values (price of anarchy, see Section 2.3) for this
comparison [8]. Note that if the interest graph equals the complete graph, our I-BNCG coincides with the
BNCG by Alon et al. [2].
1.2 Related Work
Network creation games combine two crucial aspects of modern communication networks: network design
and routing. Many such networks consist of autonomous peers and have a highly dynamic character. Thus,
it seems natural to use a game theoretic approach to study their evolution and behavior. Given the possibility
to change the network structure (buy bandwidth, create new links, etc.), peers typically try to improve their
individual communication experience. The question whether this selfish behavior results in an overall good
network structure constitutes the central question of the study of network creation games as introduced by
Fabrikant et al. [6]. In their model, the authors use a fixed cost parameter α > 0 representing the cost of
buying a single edge. The players (nodes) in such a network creation game can buy edges to decrease their
local communication cost (the average distance to all other nodes in the network). Each player’s objective
is to minimize the sum of its individual communication cost and the money spent on buying edges. In
their seminal work, the authors proved (among other things) an upper bound of O (√α) on the price of
anarchy (PoA) in the case of α < n2. Albers et al. [1] proved a constant PoA for α = O (√n) and the
first sublinear worst case bound of O (n1/3) for general α. Demaine et al. [5] were the first to prove an
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O (nε) bound for α in the range of Ω (n) and o (n lg n). Furthermore, Demaine et al. introduced a new
cost measure for the private cost, causing the individual nodes to consider their maximum distance to all
remaining nodes instead of the average distance. For this variant they showed that the PoA is at most 2
for α ≥ n, O
(
min{4
√
lgn, (n/α)1/3}
)
for 2
√
lg n ≤ α ≤ n, and O (n2/α) for α < 2√lg n. Recently,
Mihala´k and Schlegel [10] could prove that for α > 273 · n all equilibria in the AVG-version are trees (and
thus the PoA is constant). If α > 129, the same result applies to the MAX-version.
While network creation games as defined by Fabrikant et al. and their variants seem to capture the
dynamics and evolution caused by the selfish behavior of peers in an accurate way, there is a major drawback
of these models: most of them compute the private communication cost of the peers over the complete
network. Given the immense size of such communication networks, this seems rather unrealistic. Typically,
participants want to communicate only in small groups, with a small subset of other participants they know.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other work taking this into account is due to Halevi and Mansour [7].
They introduce a concept similar to our interests (see model description). For the objective of minimizing the
average distance of a peer to its interests, Halevi and Mansour proved the existence of pure nash equilibria
for almost all α (in particular, α ≤ 1 and α ≥ 2). For general α they provided an upper bound of O (√n)
for the PoA. In the case of α or d constant (where d denotes the average degree in the interest graph) or
α = O (nd), Halevi and Mansour upper bounded the PoA by a constant. Furthermore, the authors provided
a family of problem instances for which the PoA is lower bounded by Ω (log n/ log log n).
As can be seen from the results stated above, the results in all variants of these network creation games
largely depend on the cost parameter α. Moreover, as has been stated in [6], computing a player’s best
response for these models is NP-hard. This observation leads to a new, simplified formalization by Alon
et al. [2], trying to capture the crux of the problem without the burden of this additional parameter. They
introduce basic network creation games (BNCG), where players no longer have to pay for edges. Instead,
their possible actions are limited to so called improving edge swaps: exchanging a single, incident edge
with an edge to some arbitrary node in the network which improves the node’s private cost. Other than that,
the general problem stays untouched, especially the private cost function (average distance or maximum
distance to all other nodes). Best responses in the resulting game turn out to be polynomially computable.
Restricting the initial network (connection graph) to trees, they show that the only equilibrium in the AVG-
version is a star graph. Without restrictions, all swap equilibria are proven to have a diameter of 2O(
√
lgn)
.
For the MAX-version, the authors prove a maximum diameter of 3 if the resulting equilibrium is a tree.
Furthermore, the authors show the existence of an equilibrium of diameter Θ(
√
n). Our model is a direct
generalization of these BNCGs, introducing the concept of interests that model the fact that participants are
seldom interested in the complete network.
Up to now, the only other work on BNCGs we are aware of is due to Lenzner [9]. He studies the
dynamics of the AVG-version of BNCGs and proves for the case of tree connection graphs a convergence
to pure equilibria. Moreover, he proves that any sequence of improving edge swaps converges in at most
O (n3) steps to a star equilibrium.
1.3 Our Contribution
In our work, we introduce a generalized class of the BNCG by taking the different interests of individual
peers into account. We analyze the structure and quality for the case that the initial connection graph is
a tree. For the MAX-version, we derive a worst case upper bound of O (√n) for the private costs of the
individual players in an equilibrium. Thereto, we introduce and apply a novel combinatorial technique that
captures the structural properties of our equilibria (see MAX-arrangement, Definition 2.4). Further, for
interest graphs with a maximum independent set of size M ≤ √n (e.g., the clique graph with M = 1),
we can improve the private cost upper bound to O (M). Using a circular interest graph, we construct an
4
equilibrium with a player having private cost Ω (
√
n), showing that our bound is tight. By extending this
construction, we are able to prove a tight bound of Θ(
√
n) on the price of anarchy (ratio between the social
cost of a worst case equilibrium and an optimum [8]). Using a star-like connection graph, we show the
existence of a MAX-equilibrium with small social cost, yielding a price of stability (ratio between the social
cost of a best case equilibrium and an optimum [4, 3]) of at most two for an I-BNCG. For the case of an
I-BNCG featuring a general connection graph (instead of a tree), we show that the price of anarchy is Θ(n).
Additionally, for the AVG-version we show a private cost lower bound for individual players of Ω (n).
2 Maximum Distance Games with Interests
In this section we consider the MAX-version. For this, we show a tight worst case upper bound for the
private cost of every node in a MAX-equilibrium of Θ
(√
n
) (with n being the number of nodes) as well
as the same upper bound for the price of anarchy. The price of stability we can limit to be at most two.
For general connection graphs (that may contain cycles) we provide an instance with social cost Ω (n2),
yielding a price of anarchy of Θ(n).
2.1 Private Cost Upper Bound
In the following we prove the private cost upper bound as stated below:
Theorem 2.1 Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a MAX-equilibrium,
n := |V |. Then, for all v ∈ V we have c(v) ∈ O (√n).
Outline of the proof: We consider a tree network in a MAX-equilibrium and take an arbitrary node with
maximal private cost among all nodes. Starting with this node, we define a special node sequence, called
MAX-arrangement, that will contribute the following properties: each two successive nodes of the sequence
are interested in each other and every node of the sequence is “far away” from all previous nodes of the
sequence. We will prove that such a sequence necessarily exists and that its length is proportional to the
private cost of the starting node.
In detail, we prove with Lemma 2.6 and Lemma 2.7 that a shortest path traversal of a MAX-arrangement
in the connection graph uses each edge of the tree at most twice and by this limits its length. Lemma 2.8
constructively shows that given a node with maximal private cost, there always exists a MAX-arrangement
starting with this node and ending with a node with a private cost of 3. Lemma 2.5 gives us that the number
of nodes in this MAX-arrangement is proportional to the maximal private cost of the first node. Comparing
the maximum private cost of a node with the length of a shortest path traversal of any corresponding MAX-
arrangement gives us the upper bound.
Remark 2.2 Note that in a MAX-equilibrium, each node v with | I (v)| = 1 has c(v) = 1. Hence, for a
node v′ with c(v′) > 1 it holds | I (v′)| > 1.
Lemma 2.3 (T-configuration) Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a MAX-
equilibrium, v ∈ V with | I (v)| ≥ 2. Then there exist nodes x, y ∈ I (v) such that |d(x, v) − d(v, y)| ≤ 1
and v is connected by at most one edge to the shortest path from x to y and c(v) = d(v, x).
Proof. Let v ∈ V with | I (v)| ≥ 2 and let x ∈ I (v) with d(v, x) = c(v). Assume for contradiction
that all nodes x′ ∈ I (v) \ {x} are at distance d(x′, v) ≤ c(v) − 2 from v. Consider the shortest path
v → v1 → v2 → . . . → x to node x. In this case v can reduce its private cost by the swap v : [v1 → v2]
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v0
v1v2
xi2
yi2
xi1
yi1
xi3
yi3
xi4
yi4
Figure 2: Visualization for Lemma 2.3. Node v0 can
perform improving swap v0 : [v1 → v2].
v0
vk−1
w1
w2
vk=w0
vk+1=wt
Figure 3: Visualization for the proof of Lemma 2.7.
Edge {w0, w1} is used two times.
since this swap improves v’s distance to x by 1 but increases the distances to every node in I (v) \ {x} by at
most 1. Hence, this contradicts the graph being in a MAX-equilibrium.
We now consider all pairs (xi, yi) ∈ I (v)× I (v) for that hold d(v, xi) = c(v) and d(v, yi) ≥ c(v) − 1.
Let us assume that v is connected to each shortest path from xi to yi by at least two edges that do not lie on
that path. (See Figure 2 for a visualization.) Thus, v is not located on the shortest path from xi to yi. This
implies that in the graph G \ {v} for each pair (xi, yi) there exists a connected component containing both
nodes xi, yi. Since each two nodes at distance exactly c(v) form such a pair, all nodes of I (v) at distance
exactly c(v) must be located in the same connected component, which then gives for every pair (xi, yi)
that both nodes are contained in the same connected component. Hence, all nodes x′ ∈ I (v) at distance
d(x′, v) ≥ c(v) − 1 from v are in the same connected component and by the two edges distance constraint,
there must be a path v → v1 → v2 that is a subpath of every path from v to every node xi and yi. Hence, v
can perform the improving swap v : [v1 → v2] (cf. Figure 2). This swap decreases the distance to all nodes
xi, yi by one and increases each distance to other nodes (i.e., nodes w ∈ I (v) with d(w, v) ≤ c(v) − 2) by
at most one and hence contradicts G being in a MAX-equilibrium. 
Definition 2.4 (MAX-arrangement) Let v0 ∈ V and v1 ∈ I (v0) such that d(v0, v1) = c(v0). Consider
a sequence of nodes v0, . . . , vm with vi ∈ I (vi−1), i = 1, . . . ,m, with private costs c(vi) > 3 for i =
0, . . . ,m− 1 and c(vm) = 3. We call this sequence a MAX-arrangement if for all i = 2, . . . ,m it holds:
vi = argmax
vi∈I (vi−1)
{
d(vi−2, vi)
∣∣∣∣ vi−1 is connected by ≤ 1 edge to theshortest path from vi−2 to vi
}
See Figure 4 for a visualization of a MAX-arrangement.
The key property of a MAX-arrangement is stated by the following two lemmas: consider a node vi in
a MAX-arrangement, then (1) its MAX-arrangement successor node vi+1 cannot have a much lower private
cost than vi and (2) in the connection graph the shortest path from vi to vi+1 can overlap by at most one
edge with the shortest path to vi’s MAX-arrangement predecessor node.
Lemma 2.5 For each two successive nodes vi, vi+1 (0 ≤ i < m) in a MAX-arrangement v0, . . . , vm it
holds d(vi, vi+1) ≥ c(vi)− 1 and hence c(vi+1) ≥ c(vi)− 1.
Proof. Consider a node vi, 0 ≤ i < m, in the MAX-arrangement. Then by Lemma 2.3 there exist
x, y ∈ I (vi) with d(vi, x) = c(vi) and c(vi) ≥ d(vi, y) ≥ c(vi) − 1 such that vi is connected by at most
one edge to the shortest path from x to y. At least one of these nodes is a valid candidate for the next
MAX-arrangement node vi+1 (even if neither x or y is vi+1, we get a distance lower bound) and we get
d(vi, vi+1) ≥ min{d(vi, x), d(vi, y)} ≥ c(vi)− 1. This gives, c(vi+1) ≥ c(vi)− 1. 
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v0 v1
v2
v3
v4 v5
. . .
vm−1 vm
Figure 4: Visualization of a MAX-arrangement. The radius of a circle around a node corresponds to the
node’s private cost. Curled lines denote shortest paths.
Lemma 2.6 (Increasing Distance) Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a
MAX-equilibrium with v0, . . . , vk a MAX-arrangement. Then the distances to v0 are monotonously increas-
ing, i.e., d(v0, vi) ≤ d(v0, vi+1) for i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Proof. By c(v1) ≥ 3 we get with Remark 2.2 that | I (v1)| ≥ 2. Hence by Lemma 2.3 there exists a node
v2, such that the paths v1 to v0 and v1 to v2 overlap by at most one edge. By construction of the MAX-
arrangement the distance d(v0, v2) is maximal among all distances from v0 to nodes v ∈ I (v1) and hence
we get d(v0, v1) ≤ d(v0, v2).
Assume that there is a node vi with smallest index i ≥ 2 in the MAX-arrangement for which the claim
does not hold. This is d(v0, vi−1) ≤ d(v0, vi) > d(v0, vi+1). Denote by x the most distant node from v0
that is on all shortest paths from v0 to vi−1, v0 to vi, and v0 to vi+1. (Such a node x exists since especially
v0 fulfills the restrictions.) By the choice of i and since all these paths cross node x, we get:
d(x, vi−1) ≤ d(x, vi) > d(x, vi+1) (1)
By definition of the MAX-arrangement, vi is connected by at most one edge to the shortest path from vi−1
to vi+1. Hence, x must be a node on the path from vi−1 to vi+1. First note that x cannot be vi or a neighbor
of vi, since for those cases with (1) we get d(x, vi+1) < d(x, vi) ≤ 1. Further, x must lie on the shortest
path from vi−1 to vi, since otherwise x would lie on the shortest path from vi to vi+1 which implies by
d(vi−1, vi) ≥ 3 that d(x, vi) < d(x, vi−1). This gives d(x, vi) ≤ d(x, vi+1) and is a contradiction. 
Lemma 2.7 Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a MAX-equilibrium. Con-
sider a MAX-arrangement v0, . . . , vm. Then, no edge in E is used more than two times by the shortest path
visiting the nodes v0, . . . , vm in the given order.
Proof. We label the nodes of G by their distances to v0. This is, for every v ∈ V we define a level by
level(v) := d(v0, v). We consider an arbitrary node vk with k ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and the corresponding
shortest path vk =: w0 → w1 → . . . → wt := vk+1 to node vk+1. By definition, vk is connected by at
most one edge to the shortest path from vk−1 to vk+1 (see Figure 3). By Lemma 2.6 we have level(vk−1) ≤
level(vk) ≤ level(vk+1). Hence, for i = 2, . . . , t − 1 we get level(wi) < level(wi+1). This is, at most
one edge (explicitly edge {w0, w1}) of the shortest path v0 to vk is used a second time by the shortest path
traversal from vk to vk+1. By Lemma 2.5 we have t ≥ c(vk)− 1 ≥ 3 and get level(vk) < level(vk+1). 
Now we prove that given a node v0 with private cost c(v0) > 3 of a MAX-equilibrium tree, there exists
a MAX-arrangement that starts with this node and ends with a node with private cost of 3. With the previous
results about MAX-arrangements, this finally leads to the upper bound.
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Lemma 2.8 Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a MAX-equilibrium. Then
for v0, v1 ∈ V with d(v0, v1) > 3 and v1 ∈ I (v0) there exists a MAX-arrangement starting with v0. And for
every such MAX-arrangement it holds that the shortest path that visits all nodes of the MAX-arrangement
in the given order uses at least (c(v0)2 + c(v0)− 6)/4 different edges of G.
Proof. Existence: v0, v1 obviously fulfill the conditions for a MAX-arrangement. Thus, it suffices to show
that given the beginning of a MAX-arrangement v0, . . . , vi with c(vj) > 3, j = 0, . . . , i − 1 we can either
find a next node vi+1 that suffices the conditions or otherwise c(vi) = 3. Assume c(vi) > 3. Then, by
Lemma 2.3 there exist x, y ∈ I (vi) with d(vi, x) = c(vi) and c(vi) ≥ d(vi, y) ≥ c(vi) − 1 such that vi is
connected by at most one edge to the shortest path from x to y. Since c(vi) > 3, also c(x) ≥ 3 and c(y) ≥ 3
hold. Now, for at least one node (x or y) we have that this node is most distant to vi−1, it is not vi−2, and
thus it fulfills the conditions for a MAX-arrangement.
Traversal: Given the existence, we now can apply the previous lemmas for providing the minimal length
of such a MAX-arrangement: Lemma 2.5 states that by construction of the MAX-arrangement we always
have c(vi+1) ≥ c(vi) − 1. Lemma 2.6 implies that no node can be contained more than once in a MAX-
arrangement. By the arguments above we get that we always can find a new node for the MAX-arrangement
until we reach a node w with c(w) = 3. Hence, the MAX-arrangement contains at least c(v0) − 2 nodes.
Since the distance between two succeeding nodes in the MAX-arrangement decreases by at most one per
node, a traversal of this MAX-arrangement consists of at least
∑c(v0)
i=3 i = (c(v0)
2 + c(v0) − 6)/2 edges.
From these edges, by Lemma 2.7, at least (c(v0)2 + c(v0)− 6)/4 edges are different. 
Theorem 2.1 (Restated) Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a MAX-equi-
librium, n := |V |. Then, for all v ∈ V we have c(v) ∈ O (√n).
Proof. W.l.o.g. we may assume that there is at least one interest {v, v′} ∈ I with d(v, v′) ≥ 3. Let
nodes v0, v1 ∈ V , v1 ∈ I (v0) have maximal distance among all nodes, D := d(v0, v1) = c(v0). Then,
by Lemma 2.8 we can find a MAX-arrangement v0, . . . , vm whose traversal uses at least (D2 +D − 6)/4
different edges. Since our tree has exactly n− 1 edges, we get (D2 +D− 6)/4 ≤ n− 1 as an upper bound
for the size of every MAX-arrangement and hence the private cost upper bound is D ∈ O (√n). 
2.2 The Private Cost Upper Bound is Tight
The proven upper bound of O(√|V |) for the private costs is also tight, i.e., there exist interest graphs and
corresponding tree networks in a MAX-equilibrium with at least one player having private cost Ω
(√|V |).
For this, we consider an interest graph that forms a circle.
Remark 2.9 Let I := {{vi, vi+1}|i = 1, . . . , n − 1} ∪ {{vn, v1}} be a set of interests for nodes V :=
{v1, . . . , vn}, such that (V, I ) forms a circle. Consider a connection graph G in which a node vi has
degree one. Then vi cannot perform any swap if and only if it holds |d(vi−1, vi) − d(vi, vi+1)| ≤ 1 and
vi is connected by one edge to the shortest path from vi−1 to vi+1 (hence vi is in a T-configuration, cf.
Lemma 2.3).
Theorem 2.10 There exists a set of interests and a corresponding tree G = (V,E) in a MAX-equilibrium
with a node vi ∈ V that has private cost c(vi) ∈ Ω
(√|V |).
Proof. For nodes v1, . . . , vn consider the interests I := {{vi, vi+1}|i = 1, . . . , n − 1} ∪ {{vn, v1}} and a
corresponding connection graph G = (V,E) as stated in Figure 5. We claim that this graph is in a MAX-
equilibrium yielding private cost of c(vi) = O (
√
n) for a node vi ∈ V . The graph is designed such that the
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v1 vn vn−1 vn−3 vl+D−2 vl vl−D+2 vk+5 vk+2 vk+1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v2 v3 v4 vi−1 vi vi+1 vi+2 vk−2 vk−1 vkD − 1 D D − 1
Figure 5: Tree G = (V,E) in a MAX-equilibrium with private cost Ω (D) for node vi, with D :=√|V | − 2 + 1, k := 2D − 3, and l = n−∑Di=1 i.
private costs of nodes v1, . . . , vi increase by one each (i.e., for j = 1, . . . , i − 1: c(vj+1) = c(vj) + 1) and
from vi+1 to vk+1 decrease by one each (i.e., for j = i + 1, . . . , k: c(vj) = c(vj+1) + 1). Node vi has the
maximal private cost. We first compute the exact value for c(vi) given by this setting, then we argue why no
node in this graph can perform an improving step.
Denote the maximal distance from vi to an interest of vi by D. Then D must fulfill n =
∑D−2
i=1 i +∑D−3
i=1 i+2(D− 2) + 3 = D2− 2D+3. Hence, D =
√
n− 2+1. This yields private cost of √n− 2+ 1
for node vi and gives for the parameters i := D − 1 and k := 2D − 3.
For each node with degree greater than 1 in G we have private cost of 1 and hence no improving step
is possible. For each node with degree equals 1 in G we get by Remark 2.9 that those nodes also cannot
perform an improving step. 
2.3 Existence of MAX-equilibria and the Price of Anarchy
In this section we consider the social cost of a MAX-equilibrium, this is, we compute the price of stability
(PoS) and the price of anarchy (PoA). Let the social optimum represent the smallest social cost of any tree
over all nodes (which is not necessarily in a MAX-equilibrium). Then, the price of stability denotes the
ratio between the minimum social cost of a MAX-equilibrium and the cost of a social optimum. Whereas
the price of anarchy denotes the ratio between the worst social cost of a MAX-equilibrium and the cost of a
social optimum.
We show that there always exists a MAX-equilibrium whose social cost is at most twice as bad as a
social optimum. Furthermore, we derive an upper bound for the social cost from the private cost upper
bound and show that this bound is tight. Eventually, we can conclude that the price of anarchy is Θ(
√
n)
and the price of stability is at most 2.
Lemma 2.11 For every set of interests I there exists a corresponding tree G = (V,E) in a MAX-equilibri-
um that causes social cost c(G) ≤ 2n, n := |V |.
Proof. For the given set of interests we construct a graph by application of Algorithm 1. We argue that the
computed graph is a tree and that this tree is in a MAX-equilibrium.
In the first loop (lines 4–6) we only add edges between two nodes v and w that are interested in each
other and where one of these nodes has exactly one interest. Thus, the resulting graph at line 6 is acyclic.
Note that for every node v ∈ B that is considered in the second loop (lines 7–12) it holds: (1) v is interested
in at most one node to that it is not yet connected and (2) v is connected to a node u ∈ A (otherwise v would
have degree one in the interest graph and therefore would be an element of A instead of B). Thus, adding an
edge {v,w} with v ∈ B and I (v)\{u ∈ I (v) | ∃u′ (u, u′) ∈ E} = {w} in lines 9 does not create cycles in
the graph. Finally, in the next loop (lines 14–16) we create a star that connects all formerly created disjoint
trees of the graph and by this, the constructed graph (V,E) is a set of trees. In the final loop (lines 17–20),
we connect all remaining unconnected components.
It remains to show that (V,E) is in a MAX-equilibrium. By construction, each node added during the
first two loops (lines 4–12) has private cost of 1. The center node x (selected in line 13) of the star also has
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Algorithm 1: Computation of MAX-equilibrium with social cost of at most 2n
1 E ← ∅
2 A← {v ∈ V | | I (v)| = 1}
3 B ← V \A
4 foreach v ∈ A do
5 E ← E ∪ {{v,w} | I(v) = {w}} ⊲ note that w exists and is unique
6 end
7 while ∃ v ∈ B with #{w ∈ I (v) | {v,w} 6∈ E} ≤ 1 do
8 if #{w ∈ I (v) | {v,w} 6∈ E} = 1 then
9 E ← E ∪ {{v,w} | w ∈ I (v), {v,w} /∈ E} ⊲ note that w exists and is unique
10 end
11 B ← B \ {v}
12 end
13 select an arbitrary node x ∈ B and assign B ← B \ {x}
14 foreach w ∈ B do
15 E ← E ∪ {{x,w}}
16 end
17 foreach connected component C ⊂ (V,E) with x 6∈ C do
18 select an arbitrary node y ∈ C
19 E ← E ∪ {x, y}
20 end
21 return E;
private cost of 1, since each interest of x is either connected to x in the previous two loops (lines 4–12) or it
is connected to x in the last loop (lines 14–16). For each interest u of a node w ∈ B that is chosen in line 14
it holds: Either u is chosen in the previous loops (lines 4–12) and the edge {u,w} is added to E, or u is
connected to x in the last loop (lines 14–16). In both cases, the distance from w to u is at most 2. Thus, w
has private cost of 2. Since w /∈ A, we have |I| > 1 and thus, w cannot perform an improving step. In total,
we get private cost of at most 2 for each node. 
Theorem 2.12 The price of stability for I-BNCG is at most 2.
Proof. Let I be a set of interests over nodes V , n := |V |. Then each connection graph that is a tree induces
social cost of at least n. By Lemma 2.11 there exists a connection graph in a MAX-equilibrium with social
cost of at most 2n. Thus, the price of stability is at most 2n/n = 2. 
Next, we prepare our estimation of the price of anarchy.
Lemma 2.13 There exist interest graphs over n nodes with a corresponding MAX-equilibrium tree that
causes social cost of Ω (n · √n).
Proof. For nodes V = {v1 . . . , vn} consider the interests
I :={{vi, vi+1}|i = 1, . . . n/2− 1} ∪ {{vi, v1}|i = n/2, . . . , n}∪
{{vn/2−1, vi}|i = n/2, . . . , n}
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as stated in Figure 6. Further, we consider the connection graph G = (V,E) (stated in Figure 7) where the
nodes n/2, . . . , n are all connected to node vl. For the distance C between node vl and vl+C it must hold:
n = 2
∑C
i=1 i+
n
2 + 2C + 4. Hence, we have C =
√
2n−7−3
2 . This implies private cost of
√
2n−7+1
2 for all
nodes vn
2
, . . . , vn. Thus, the social cost of G is Ω(n ·
√
n).
It remains to show that G is in a MAX-equilibrium. But this argument is analog to the proof of
Lemma 2.10. 
Theorem 2.14 The price of anarchy for I-BNCG is Θ(√n), with n being number of nodes in the graph.
Proof. Theorem 2.1 provides an upper bound of O (√n) for the private cost of every node in a tree in a
MAX-equilibrium with n nodes. By this we get O (n · √n) as an upper bound for the social cost of every
MAX-equilibrium. Further, by Lemma 2.13 we get Ω (n · √n) as a worst case lower bound for the social
cost of a graph in a MAX-equilibrium. For the social optimum we can get Θ(n). (Social optimum incurs
cost of at least n and at most 2n.) Hence, by combination of these results we get Θ(n · √n/n) = Θ (√n)
for the price of anarchy. 
2.4 The Price of Anarchy for I-BNCG on General Graphs
In contrast to I-BNCG on trees, the price of anarchy for general connection graphs is Θ(n).
Theorem 2.15 The price of anarchy for I-BNCG with arbitrary connection graphs is Θ(n), with n being
number of nodes in the graph.
Proof. First, note that the social costs of every instance are upper bounded by n2 and lower bounded by n.
Second, we provide an interest graph over n nodes (n ≡ 0 mod 6) and a corresponding MAX-equilibrium
graph G = (V,E) with social cost Ω
(
n2
) (see Figure 8). To this, we connect n/2 nodes to a ring (ring
nodes) and connect one additional (satellite) node to each of them. Each of the ring nodes is interested in
its three adjacent nodes in G, whereas each satellite node is interested in its neighbor at the ring and in both
satellite nodes at distance exactly n/6 + 2. This is an equilibrium and all n/2 satellite nodes have private
cost n/6 + 2. This gives a price of anarchy of Ω (n). 
3 Further Structural Properties of Equilibria
In this section we present for the MAX-version how the size of a maximum independent set in the interest
graph limits the maximal private cost of every node and by this the maximal social cost of the graph.
Furthermore, we show that in the AVG-version there are equilibria with nodes having private cost linear in
the number of nodes.
3.1 Cost Limitation for MAX-Version by MIS in the Interest Graph
By Lemma 2.8 we achieved a general upper bound for any MAX-arrangement (see Definition 2.4) con-
tributed only by the property that the network is connected. Here, we introduce a second upper bound for
a MAX-arrangement that is given by the size of a maximum independent set (MIS) in the interest graph.
Having such a MIS of size M , we can bound the maximum private costs by O(M) which yields improved
bounds for specific families of interest graphs.
Theorem 3.1 Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a MAX-equilibrium. Let
M be the size of a maximum independent set in (V, I ). Then for every MAX-arrangement v0, . . . , vm we
get: The length of this MAX-arrangement is at most 2 ·M .
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.
.
.
v2 v3 vn
2
−1 v1
vn
2
vn
2
+1
vn
Figure 6: The interest graph for the proof of Lemma 2.13.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vn
2
−C vn
2
−C+1 vn
2
−1 vn
2
. . .
vn v1 v2 vC−1 vC
vC+1vC+2vC+3vn
2
−C−1 vn
2
−C−3 vl−C vl vl+C vl+2C−1
C C C − 1
Figure 7: The connection graph for the proof of Lemma 2.13. This tree corresponds to the interests as given
in Figure 6. The parameters are C =
√
2n−7−3
2 and l =
n
2 − C − (
∑C
i=1 i+ 2).
Figure 8: Lower bound construction for the price of anarchy for general graphs. Each of the white nodes is
interested in its three neighbors. Each gray node is interested in its white neighbor and the two gray nodes
at distance exactly n/6 + 2.
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Proof. We prove that the nodes of v0, . . . , vm−1 with even index form an independent set in the interest
graph (V, I ). Consider an even index i and assume for contradiction that there is an even index k < i such
that vk ∈ I (vi). By Lemma 2.6 we get d(vk, vk+1) ≤ d(vk, vk+2). If vk+2 6= vi with Lemma 2.5 and
c(vj) > 3 for all vj in the MAX-arrangement we get d(vk, vi) > d(vk, vk+2) + 1 ≥ c(vk). But this is a
contradiction.
Thus, consider the case vk+2 = vi. Since vk+1 is connected by at most one edge to the shortest path from
vk to vk+2 and d(vk+1, vk+2) ≥ 3 we get that vk+2 6∈ I (vk). Otherwise we either get the same contradiction
as before, or vk+1 would contradict to be the most distant node in I (vk) that fulfills the MAX-arrangement
conditions.
Hence, the nodes with even index of the MAX-arrangement form an independent set in (V, I ). Since an
independent set has at most M nodes, we get an upper bound of 2 ·M . 
Corollary 3.2 Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a MAX-equilibrium,
n := |V |. Let the size M of any MIS in (V, I ) be limited by √n. Then, for v ∈ V we have c(v) ∈ O (M).
Proof. W.l.o.g we assume that there is a node with private cost greater than 3. Hence, there exists a MAX-
arrangement v0, . . . , vm, vm+1 with c(vi) > 3, i = 1, . . . ,m and c(vm+1) = 3. By Theorem 3.1 we get
m ≤ 2M . Analog to Theorem 2.1 we get the upper bound. 
Furthermore, our technique directly yields asymptotically same private cost upper bounds for complete
interest graphs on trees as those that were explicitly constructed by Alon et al. [2].
Corollary 3.3 Let I be a set of interests and G = (V,E) a corresponding tree in a MAX-equilibrium,
n := |V |. If (V, I ) is a complete graph, then the maximal private cost of every node is O (1).
We conclude our analysis of MAX-equilibria with a negative result. This is, even if there always exists a
MAX-equilibrium there are possible invocation sequences of the nodes such that the connection graph never
reaches an equilibrium.
Remark 3.4 There are invocation sequences that contain all nodes of a connection graph, where on invo-
cation each node performs a best-response improving swap (if possible), such that the nodes never reach a
MAX-equilibrium. An explicit construction of such an instance is given by Figure 9.
From Remark 3.4 we can conclude that there does not exist a potential function for general I-BNCGs.
Thus a I-BNCG is not a potential game as defined by Monderer and Shapley [11].
3.2 Linear Private Cost Lower-Bound for AVG-Version
Here, we consider the AVG-version and provide an equilibrium where a node’s private cost can be lower
bounded by the number of nodes in the connection graph. In the AVG-version, the private cost of a node is
defined by c(v) :=
∑
w∈I (v) d(v,w)/| I (v)|. In comparison, for complete interest graphs Alon et al. proved
[2] that every AVG-equilibrium tree has a diameter of at most 2, hence each node’s private cost is bounded
by 2.
Theorem 3.5 There exists a set of interests I and a corresponding tree G = (V,E) in an AVG-equilibrium,
such that G contains a node vi ∈ V that has private cost c(vi) = Ω (|V |).
Proof. We consider the graph as stated by Figure 10 with n := |V |. The graph is given by nodes
V = {v1, . . . , vn} and edges E := {{vi, vi+1}|i = 1, . . . , n − 1}. We consider the set of interests
I := {{vi, vi+1}|i = 1, . . . , n − 1} ∪ {{vn, v1}}. All nodes v2, . . . , vn−1 have private cost of 1, which
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x2
x1
y3
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y1 y2
z3
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z2
Figure 9: The gray lines are the interests, the black lines the connection graph. Consider the invocation
sequence x1, . . . , x4, y1, . . . , y4, z1, . . . , z4. On invocation, every node performs a best response swap in
the MAX-version. By this, only the following swaps are performed: x3 : [y3 → z3], y3 : [z3 → x3], z3 :
[x3 → y3] (in this order). After one sequence the connection graph is again the initial connection graph. By
repeating this sequence a MAX-equilibrium is never reached.
v1
v2 v3 v4
. . .
vn−2 vn−1
vn
Figure 10: Tree G = (V,E) in AVG-equilibrium with private costs Ω (|V |) for nodes v1 and vn.
is minimal and gives that these nodes cannot perform an improving step. For v1 we get that swapping its
edge to any other node would increase the distance to v2 by the same value as the distance to vn would
decrease. (For vn this is the symmetric case.) Hence, neither v1 nor vn can perform an improving step and
the tree is in AVG-equilibrium with c(v1) = n/2 = Ω (n). 
4 Outlook and Future Work
In this paper, we presented tight worst case bounds for the private costs as well as for the social cost in any
MAX-equilibrium on tree networks. Furthermore, we drew an interesting connection between the size of an
MIS in the interest graph and upper bounds on the private/social costs. In comparison with MAX-equilibria
on general graphs, we could show that the price of anarchy can perform much worse if the connection graph
is not acyclic. However, it remains an open question whether the price of anarchy on general connection
graphs with complete interests could perform better than O (n). For this, so far there is only a worst case
lower bound of Ω (
√
n) (by Alon et al. [2]) for the graph diameter in a MAX-equilibrium, yielding a lower
bound for the price of anarchy. Techniques similar to our MAX-arrangement-technique may allow deeper
insights into the nature of MAX-equilibria in that scenario. Apart from this, finding good upper bounds on
the social cost of an AVG-equilibrium remains a challenging problem (we gave a lower bound of Ω(n) for
the private costs).
Even if the existence of a MAX-equilibrium is always ensured (which we proved for the MAX-version
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on trees), it remains an open question whether the process ever reaches an equilibrium. We could state for the
MAX-version examples of interest graphs and corresponding invocation sequences of the nodes, where the
network never converges to a MAX-equilibrium. It seems an interesting question whether we can guarantee
the convergence by additional policies, e.g., by restricting the order in which nodes perform their swaps.
And in the case of a guaranteed convergence, how many swaps would it take to reach an equilibrium?
Currently, we only considered static interest graphs: the set of interest never changes. In practice,
interests of network participants might change over time. Introducing a discrete time model and considering
certain (possibly restricted) changes of the interest graph seems a natural way to generalize our model,
yielding an interesting online problem.
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